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ALD-231        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1703 
___________ 
 
CRAIG FRANCIS SZEMPLE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.; MS. IFILL, CMS 
ADMINISTRATOR, N.S.P.; DR. HOCHBERG, MEDICAL DIRECTOR 
 N.S.P.; ELMIRA KAPCHITS;GEORGE E. ACHEBE; CMS JOHN  
AND JANE DOES 1-30; CMS JOHN AND JANE ROES 1-30; NJDOC JOHN 
 AND JANE DOES 1-30 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-04809) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton, U.S. District Judge 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 19, 2012 
Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: July 31, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
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 Craig Szemple appeals pro se from the orders of the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. 
Because the appeal is lacking in arguable merit, we will dismiss it under 28 U.S.C. 
§1915(e)(2).  
I. 
 As the parties are familiar with the extensive background of the case we will only 
briefly mention the procedural and factual history.  Szemple is a New Jersey State 
prisoner. He filed suit against medical personnel at Northern State Prison, as well as 
against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC)
1
 and its employees, and  
Correctional Medical Services (CMS), the medical contractor for NJDOC, and its 
medical employees (CMS defendants).  Szemple claimed that the defendants failed to 
properly treat a medical condition by not evaluating him for spinal fusion surgery, instead 
choosing to manage his pain.  Szemple had been diagnosed with cervical radiculopathy in 
2001.  Following a regime of physical therapy and epidural steroid injections, a doctor 
recommended that Szemple “may be a good candidate for” spinal fusion surgery if the 
recommended treatments were not effective.  The CMS defendants pursued an alternative 
treatment for Szemple, consisting of pain medication and a consultation for pain 
management.  While Szemple initially agreed that this treatment regimen was working, 
he later alleged that the pain persisted.  
                                              
1
  NJDOC and other named defendants who were employees of NJDOC were terminated 
as parties pursuant to a Stipulation of Dismissal in August of 2010. 
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 Szemple filed his initial pro se complaint against all named defendants in October 
of 2007.  Following a successful application for pro bono counsel,
 2
 Szemple filed an 
amended complaint in May of 2010.  In his amended complaint, Szemple asserted that 
the defendants’ alleged failure to provide him with adequate medical care constituted (1) 
a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, (2) medical malpractice (3) a violation of the New Jersey 
Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §10:6-2 and (4) intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  Szemple further asserted that the defendant’s failure to maintain 
medical records constituted an additional violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.  However, this 
amended complaint did not include any claims against “Ms. Ifill,” one of the named 
defendants in the original complaint.  It also excluded any claims regarding failure to 
provide pain medication, which had been included in his original complaint. 
 In July of 2011, the defendants, excepting Ms. Ifill, filed a motion to dismiss 
pursuant Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, in the alternative, a 
motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c).  The motion did not address any of 
the claims against Ms. Ifill, nor did it address the claim for failure to maintain adequate 
medical records.  The District Court granted the motion for summary judgment in 
January of 2012. Szemple then appealed from the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment.    
   
                                              
2
  Szemple’s attorney withdrew as appointed counsel in May 2011. 
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 Following the January order for summary judgment, the defendants, including Ms. 
Ifill, filed a further motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim of failure to 
maintain the Plaintiff’s medical records, as well as all claims against Ms. Ifill.  Szemple 
never responded to the motion.  On May 30, 2012, the District Court granted summary 
judgment against the plaintiff on the remaining claims, and the case was terminated. 
Szemple then filed a certificate of service for a second notice of appeal addressing the 
claims resolved on May 30, 2012, which the District Court docketed as a certificate of 
service for Szemple’s initial notice of appeal.3  
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291
4
, and because Szemple is 
proceeding in forma pauperis, we review the appeal for possible dismissal under 28 
U.S.C. §1915(e)(2).  Our review is plenary. See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 
(3d Cir. 2005) (stating standard of review over an order granting summary judgment).  
                                              
 
3
  It seems clear that this certificate of service was intended to serve as a notice of appeal 
from the order filed May 30, 2012.  The District Court may wish to docket it as a notice 
of appeal. 
 
4
  We note that Szemple’s initial notice of appeal was filed prior to the final judgment of 
the case.  However, in limited circumstances, “a premature notice of appeal, filed after 
disposition of some of the claims before a district court, but before entry of a final 
judgment, will ripen upon the court’s disposal of the remaining claims.”  ADAPT of 
Phila v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 433 F.3d. 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Cape May Greene, 
Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1983)).  All of Szemple’s claims have now 
been resolved.  Accordingly, the original order is now appealable, and we have 
jurisdiction. 
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An appeal must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) if it has no arguable basis in 
law or fact.  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).  
III. 
 We first address Szemple’s claims which arise under 42 U.S.C. §1983.  These 
claims are barred, as Szemple failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies.  
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought 
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 or this title . . . by a prisoner 
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 
remedies as are available are exhausted.  See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a), Booth v. Churner, 532 
U.S. 731 (2001).  Exhaustion of administrative remedies must be in accordance with 
applicable regulations and policies, and noncompliance cannot be excused by the courts. 
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83 (2006).  Failure to comply with procedural 
requirements of the applicable prison’s grievance system will result in a procedural 
default of the claim.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-32 (3d Cir.2004). 
 Szemple did not seek administrative relief pertaining to his claims.  Szemple did 
file several grievances prior to filing his complaint; however, they all pertained to 
allegations that the defendants allowed his pain medication to lapse.
5
  None of his 
grievances address his current claims, the alleged failures to have him evaluated for 
                                              
5
  In his original complaint, Szemple included a claim pertaining to failure to provide pain 
medication.  However, he did not include this claim in his amended complaint.  
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spinal fusion surgery and to maintain adequate medical records.
6
  As Szemple failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies, he is precluded from bringing his 1983 claims 
against the defendants. 
 Szemple next asserted that the defendants’ failure to treat his medical condition 
was a violation of the NJCRA.  Given the nature of Szemple’s complaint, he effectively 
asserted that CMS had in place an unconstitutional policy, and that CMS’s employees 
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.  We agree with the District 
Court that Szemple’s claims are without merit.  
 The NJCRA provides, in part: 
Any person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal 
protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or 
laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or 
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State . . . may bring a 
civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §10:6-2.  The NJCRA is interpreted as analogous to §1983.  See Rezem 
Family Associates, LP v. Borough of Millstone, 30 A.3d 1061 (N.J. Super. 2011) (“[N.J. 
Stat. Ann.§10:6-2] was modeled after §1983”), Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 
F.Supp.2d 417, 443 (D.N.J. 2011). S zemple bases his NJCRA claim on Article 1, 
paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution, which provides, in relevant part: 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and 
                                              
6
  Szemple did eventually file a grievance regarding the decision not to have him 
evaluated for spinal fusion surgery.  However, Szemple filed this grievance in 2010, 
years after filing his complaint in the District Court. 
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unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.”  N.J. Const. Art. I, Para 12.  This provision of 
the New Jersey Constitution is generally interpreted as analogous to the Eighth 
Amendment.  State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 210 (N.J. 1987).  
 We agree with the District Court that Szemple failed to establish that CMS has a 
policy that limits medical consultation for non-medical reasons.  To sustain a §1983 
claim, or a NJCRA claim, a plaintiff must show that a defendant had in place a custom or 
policy which resulted in constitutional deprivation.  See Stomel v. City of Camden, 927 
A.2d 129 (N.J. 2007) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 
(1978)).  Szemple did not identify any custom or policy by CMS that violated his 
constitutional rights in his amended complaint or any subsequent filing.  Thus, Szemple 
has no cause of action under the NJCRA against CMS or the CMS defendants. 
 The District Court correctly analyzed Szemple’s claims against the CMS 
defendants under the standard set in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1976) 
(holding that the plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference 
to his serious medical needs in order to state an Eighth Amendment medical claim upon 
which relief may be granted).  The test for whether a prison official acted with deliberate 
indifference is whether the defendant “acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a 
substantial risk of serious harm” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994).  To 
establish a constitutional violation the indifference must be deliberate and the actions 
intentional.  Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 
1976).  “A complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a 
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medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth 
Amendment.”  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.  It is well established that as a long as a physician 
exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional 
rights.  Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990).  Further, 
“mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not support a claim of an 
Eighth Amendment violation. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 
326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).  
 In the present case there is nothing on the record to indicate deliberate 
indifference.  The CMS defendants conducted testing and consultations, and provided 
Szemple with treatment.  Indeed, even Szemple initially agreed that this treatment was 
effective.  The CMS defendants may not have proceeded with the specific treatment that 
Szemple now requests, but their treatment was not deliberately indifferent. 
 We next turn to Szemple’s claim against CMS for medical malpractice.  We agree 
with the District Court that the affidavit of merit filed by Szemple was insufficient, and 
that his claim thus suffered from a fatal defect. N.J. Stat. Ann § 2A:53A-27 provides in 
relevant part: 
In any action for damages for personal injuries . . . resulting from an 
alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his 
profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the 
date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each 
defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there 
exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or 
exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the 
complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or 
treatment practices.  
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 Szemple’s affidavit of merit did not address claims against the remaining 
defendants; rather, it only referred to NJDOC. While the affiant claimed to have reviewed 
medical records of both CMS and NJDOC, the affidavit stated that only NJDOC had 
deviated from acceptable professional standards, and said nothing of CMS. The affidavit 
did not specify what actions had deviated from professional standards.
7
  This affidavit did 
not satisfy the requirements of N.J. Stat. Ann § 2A:53A-27. 
 Szemple’s final claim is for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Under 
New Jersey law, a plaintiff must “establish intentional and outrageous conduct by the 
defendant, proximate cause, and distress that is severe” to establish a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc., 544 A.2d 857, 
863 (N.J. 1988).  The emotional distress suffered must be “so severe that no reasonable 
man could be expected to endure it.” Id.  Szemple did not establish that he suffered 
severe distress.  Szemple asserted that his diagnosed condition of post-traumatic stress 
disorder was aggravated as a result of being denied appropriate care, but he did not 
provide any support for this assertion.  Without any specific evidence of the nature of his 
                                              
7
  Szemple asserted that the “common knowledge” exception to the requirement for an 
affidavit of merit applied to his case. “An affidavit need not be provided in common 
knowledge cases when an expert will not be called to testify” regarding professional 
standards or practices. Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 495, 498 (N.J. 2001). 
However, Szemple asserted that the common knowledge exception pertained only to his 
claim that the defendants denied him medication.  This claim is not part of his amended 
complaint.  
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increased pain, it is unclear whether he suffered severe emotional distress.  This claim is 
without merit.  
V. 
 In sum, because this appeal is lacking in arguable legal merit, we will dismiss it 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§1915(e)(2). 
 
 
